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Abstract
This paper analyses optimal discretionary non-coordinated monetary
and ﬁscal stabilization policies in a micro-founded New-Keynesian model
of a two-country monetary union with country-size asymmetry, under two
policy scenarios. A balanced-budget policy scenario and a policy scenario
where the presence of government debt limits the macroeconomic stabi-
lization eﬀort and enlarges the sources of strategic policy interactions.
Numerical results indicate that non-cooperation exacerbates the ﬁscal
policy activism of a small country while moderating that of a large coun-
try. In the balanced-budget scenario, non-cooperation improves (reduces)
welfare for a small (large) country while, in the high-debt scenario, it pro-
duces the opposite results. Cooperation dominates non-cooperation for
the union as a whole.
Keywords: Monetary union; optimal ﬁscal and monetary policies; asymmet-
ric countries. JEL codes: E52; E61; E62; E63
1 Introduction
In the European Monetary Union (EMU) a common monetary policy coexists
with decentralized ﬁscal policies. There is the case for ﬁscal policy to be used as
a stabilization device but, strategic interactions between non-coordinated poli-
cies may meaningfully limit such a role. Country-size asymmetry, such as that
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1observed within the EMU, as well as the constraints imposed by the available
sources of government ﬁnancing are critical for the design of optimal policies
and may crucially shape the strategic interactions between policymakers.
Small and large union-countries are diversely aﬀected by equivalent idiosyn-
cratic shocks; their ﬁscal policies cause asymmetric cross-border eﬀects and im-
pinge on union-wide variables with diﬀerent magnitudes. Suﬀering to a larger
extent the eﬀects of country-speciﬁc shocks, a small country is more likely to
experience a worse stabilization performance than a large one. Furthermore, as
its ﬁscal policy spillovers are smaller, the government of a small country faces
accrued incentives towards ﬁscal policy activism, while that of a large country
faces opposite incentives. These divergent incentives may even have diﬀerent
stabilization consequences, whether or not policymakers are constrained by the
need to control government debt. Relative to a debt-unconstrained policy sce-
nario — where lump sum taxes always adjust to ensure balanced-budgets — a
debt-constrained policy scenario limits the macroeconomic stabilization eﬀort
and, since monetary policy now has debt repercussions, enlarges the sources of
strategic interactions between monetary and ﬁscal policies that can be diﬀer-
ently exploited by small and large countries.
Key questions are then (i) to assess how debt constraints and diﬀerent pol-
icy regimes shape the macroeconomic stabilization outcomes in a country-size
asymmetric monetary union; (ii) to appraise how far these outcomes are from
the optimal solution; and, (iii) to establish under which conditions alternative
institutional policy arrangements are welfare-improving and supported by large
countries.
In order to address these issues we use a two-country micro-founded macroe-
conomic model with monopolistic competition and sticky prices, in line with that
developed by Beetsma and Jensen (2004, 2005). As in Leith and Wren-Lewis
(2007a, 2007b), the model allows for ﬁscal policy to have demand and supply-
side eﬀects, by considering as ﬁscal policy instruments the home-biased public
consumption and the tax rate, under two policy scenarios. A balanced-budget
policy scenario, where the ability of ﬁscal policy to promote stabilization is
magniﬁed and the sources of strategic interactions between monetary and ﬁscal
policies are minimized; and, a high-debt policy scenario, where ﬁscal policy sta-
bilization gains are restricted by the need to control government debt and the
risk of harmful policy-mixes is inﬂated by the great eﬀectiveness of monetary
policy on debt adjustment.
We assume that the monetary authority — maximizing the union-wide welfare
— and the ﬁscal authorities — maximizing their national counterpart — engage in
discretionary policy games. Optimal solutions are computed numerically using
appropriate algorithms that reﬂect the diﬀerent timing structures of the (non-
cooperative) policy games: Nash, monetary leadership and ﬁscal leadership.
We follow the methodology developed in the recent work of Kirsanova and co-
authors (Blake and Kirsanova, 2009, for a closed-economy setup, and Kirsanova
et al., 2005, for an open-economy setup). Moreover, we examine whether the
solutions obtained under these diﬀerent policy games can be improved either by
policy cooperation or by monetary policy delegation to a weight-conservative
2central bank.
Our main contribution to the existing literature is twofold. First, we allow
for country-size asymmetry in a non-cooperative monetary union. Second, our
model also captures how optimal discretionary stabilization policies are con-
strained by the need to ensure debt sustainability. A number of recent papers,
also using a micro-founded DSGE framework, have examined monetary and ﬁs-
cal policy interactions in a monetary union. However, a signiﬁcant number have
analyzed the nature of optimal policy only under policy cooperation, as is the
case of Beetsma and Jensen (2004) or Galí and Monacelli (2008), in a balanced-
budget policy scenario, and Ferrero (2009), in a debt-policy scenario. Another
important branch of this literature has considered the case of non-cooperation
but only few authors have used a dynamic model.1 In this spirit and closer
to our paper, van Aarle et al. (2002) and Beetsma and Jensen (2005), for in-
stance, analyze non-cooperative monetary and ﬁscal policies under Nash, while
Kirsanova et al. (2005) examine the case of monetary leadership.2
Furthermore, to our knowledge, country-asymmetry is rarely addressed in
the literature on policy interactions in a monetary union. Canzoneri et al.
(2005), using a theoretical model calibrated to represent the Euro area, found
that a common monetary policy favours macroeconomic stabilization of the
larger countries. However, their results are obtained under non-optimal poli-
cies.3 At the empirical level and for a broad sample of countries, Furceri and
Karras (2007, 2008) found that small countries have higher business cycle volatil-
ity and the ﬁndings of Furceri and Ribeiro (2009) suggest that smaller countries
have more volatile government consumption.
In line with these results, our numerical simulations conﬁrm that a small
country performs a more active ﬁscal policy than a large one and that non-
cooperation reinforces this discrepancy. In a debt-constrained setting and fol-
lowing a shock, time-consistency requires policy instruments to stabilize debt
at its pre-shock level (debt stabilization bias, under discretion). For suﬃciently
high levels of public debt, monetary policy complements ﬁscal policy on debt
adjustment at the union level and small and large countries rely diﬀerently on
monetary policy to adjust domestic debts. Thus, under non-cooperation, ﬁs-
cal policy is further (less) active towards debt stabilization for the small (large)
country. As a consequence, in the high-debt scenario and relative to policy coop-
eration, non-cooperation reduces (improves) welfare for a small (large) country
and ampliﬁes the asymmetric distribution of the stabilization burden across
countries, with negative welfare consequences for the union as a whole. Mone-
1The traditional literature has studied this question using static models (see Beetsma and
Debrun, 2004, for a thorough review of this literature). Static models allow for analytical
solutions but cannot conveniently incorporate expectations nor can they be used to analyze
appropriately the role of public debt in policy interactions. However, some authors, like Chari
and Kehoe (2007), introduce dynamics in a tractable way through a two-period model where
public debt is set strategically.
2In contrast with the generality of this literature, Forlati (2009) examines optimal non-
coordinated (Nash) monetary and ﬁscal policies with fully micro-founded welfare criteria.
3Ferrero (2009) also allows for country-size asymmetry in his model calibration of the EMU,
but he doesn’t explicitly examine this issue, which is of minor relevance under cooperation.
3tary conservatism has proved to be a fruitful device to improve welfare for the
small country and for the union under ﬁscal leadership, where the large country
can beneﬁt from its larger strategic position vis-à-vis the central bank.
This paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we develop the setup for
policy analysis. In Section 3 we perform policy analysis related with dynamic
responses and welfare evaluation under diﬀerent policy regimes. Finally, in
Section 4 we present concluding remarks and suggest extensions for future work.
2 Setup for Policy Analysis
The model developed by Beetsma and Jensen (2004, 2005) is extended to cap-
ture country-size asymmetry, to allow for a more generic case of cross-country
consumption elasticity and to include diﬀerent ﬁscal policy scenarios.
The monetary union is modelled as a closed area with two countries, H
(Home) and F (Foreign), populated by a continuum of agents ∈ [0,1]. The
relative dimension of country i (i = H,F) is ni ∈ (0,1), with nH + nF = 1.
While subject to idiosyncratic shocks, the countries are assumed to have iden-
tical economic structures and each one is characterized by two private sectors -
households and ﬁrms -, one ﬁscal authority, and is subject to a common mone-
tary policy.
To start, we address the optimization problem of households and ﬁrms, liv-
ing at country H (equivalent to that at F). The next step is to describe the
policy environment which includes the presentation of the policy instruments,
the equilibrium conditions and the policy objectives. The remainder of this
section characterizes the policy games and presents the benchmark calibration.
2.1 Households




















































































t denoting, respectively, private consumption, per capita
public consumption on domestically produced goods and hours of work. C
i
is
an exogenous disturbance which aﬀects the demand for consumption goods and































F are consumption sub-indexes of the continuum of diﬀerentiated goods




































and θ is the elasticity of substitution between goods produced in each coun-
try.





















where P is the consumption-based price index deﬁned below, W (j) is the nom-
inal wage rate of labour of type j, Πj (k) is the share of proﬁts of domestic
ﬁrm k going to household j in country H and TH is a per capita lump sum tax.
Household j has access to a complete set of state-contingent securities that span
all possible states of nature and are traded across the union. D
j
t+1 denotes the
nominal payoﬀ of a portfolio of state-contingent securities, purchased by the j-
household at date t, while Qt,t+1 is the stochastic discount factor for one-period
ahead nominal payoﬀs, common across countries.
Assuming no trade barriers and given the structure of preferences, purchas-


































where p(h) and p(f) are the prices of typical goods h and f produced in H and
F, respectively.
The problem of the representative household can be split into an intertempo-
ral and an intratemporal problem. In regards to the household’s intratemporal
problem, it requires choosing the allocation of a given level of expenditure across
the diﬀerentiated goods to maximize the consumption index, Cj. Plugging into
the appropriate output aggregators the resulting individual demands and the
5optimal government spending allocation across domestically produced goods,
































= nHTρ−1 + nF (8)
The variable T stands for the terms-of-trade, deﬁned as the relative price of the
F-bundle of goods in terms of the H-bundle of goods (T ≡ PF/PH). According
to (8), changes in the terms-of-trade imply a larger response in a country’s
aggregate demand the smaller the size of the country, i.e., the larger the degree
of openness.












, taking as given all the other processes and the
initial wealth, as to maximize the intertemporal utility function (1) subject to























where 1 + it = 1
EtQt,t+1 is the gross risk-free nominal interest rate. Moreover,
assuming that the initial state-contingent distribution of nominal bonds is such
that the life-time budget constraints of all households are identical, the risk-
















Finally, the labour supply decision determines that the real wage for labour type




















w,t ￿ 1 is an exogenous H-speciﬁc wage markup that is used as a device
to introduce the possibility of "pure cost-push shocks" that aﬀects the equilib-
rium price behaviour but does not change the eﬃcient output, as in Benigno
and Woodford (2004, 2005).
62.2 Firms
There are a continuum of ﬁrms in country H and in country F. The production
function for the diﬀerentiated consumption good y, indexed by h ∈ [0,nH) in
country H and by f ∈ [nH,1] in country F, is described, for y(h), by
yt (h) = aH
t Lt (h) (12)
where aH
t is an exogenous H-speciﬁc technology shock, common to all H-ﬁrms,
and Lt (h) is the ﬁrm-speciﬁc labour input oﬀered by a continuum of H-households,






equals the aggregate labour input (Lt (h)).
Firms are assumed to set prices on a staggered basis, as in Calvo (1983).
Each period, a randomly selected fraction of ﬁrms at H
 
1 − αH 
have the
opportunity to change their prices, independently of the time that has elapsed
since the last price-resetting, while the remaining ﬁrms keep the prices of the
previous period. If it has the chance to reset prices in period t, an optimizing
h-ﬁrm will set po
t (h) in order to maximize the expected future proﬁts, subject
to the demand for its product and the production technology. The ﬁrst order



















































t (h) still applies at s, τH
s is a proportional tax rate on sales with the non-
zero steady-state level τH, and ζ
H is an employment subsidy fully ﬁnanced by
lump sum taxes that, removing average monopolistic and tax rate distortions,
ensures the eﬃciency of the steady-state output level.4 The price index PH












In this section, we describe the instruments and constraints for the monetary
and ﬁscal policies and present a set of meaningful objective functions facing the
policy authorities. These policy functions have a twofold purpose: (i) to enable
the derivation of optimal discretionary policy rules across several regimes of
monetary and ﬁscal policies interactions and (ii) to assess the welfare impacts
of the diﬀerent policy regimes.
4Following Leith and Wren-Lewis (2007a, 2007b), we use this employment subsidy as a
device to eliminate linear terms in the social welfare function without losing the possibility of
using the sales tax rates as ﬁscal policy instruments.
72.3.1 Policy instruments and constraints
The monetary authority sets a common nominal interest rate, it, for the union.










and the instruments used for stabilization purposes —
the home-biased government spending
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ﬁscal policy is balanced-budget and Ricardian equivalence holds. In a second
scenario, lump-sum taxes only adjust to fully accommodate the employment
subsidy and the government inter-temporal solvency condition appears as an
additional binding constraint to the set of possible equilibrium paths of the
endogenous variables. Stabilization ﬁscal policy instruments are the same as in
the ﬁrst scenario - GH and τH - and, thus, ﬁscal policy encompasses demand
















t represent the per capita nominal government debt of country
H and F, respectively.6
Equivalently,
bi

















, i = H,F (16)




Pt denotes the real value of debt at maturity in
per capita terms.
2.3.2 Equilibrium Conditions
To solve for the optimal policy, authorities have to take into account both the
private sector behaviour as well as the budget constraints, described above.














t = −scρnHqt + (1 − sc)gF
t + sccw
t (18F)
5For simplicity, we admit that government debt is zero in this scenario.
6With asset markets clearing only at the monetary union level, the sole public sector inter-
temporal budget constraint is the union-wide consolidated debt. However, in the context of
a monetary union with an institutional arrangement like the EMU, there are arguments to

















































































1 − αH  
1 − αHβ
 




1 − αF  
1 − αFβ
 
αF (1 + θη)
,
  εbH,t and   εbF,t are composite shocks deﬁned as








(1 − sc)   GH
t − τH   Y H
t +
 
1 − τH 












(1 − sc)   GF
t − τF   Y F
t +
 
1 − τF 




and where lower case variables refer to variables in gaps. For a generic variable,
Xt, its gap is deﬁned as xt =   Xt−   Xt, where   Xt and   Xt denote, respectively, their
eﬀective and eﬃcient values, in log-deviations from the zero-inﬂation eﬃcient
steady state (see, section 2.3.3, below).7 A "union-wide" variable, Xw, is deﬁned
as Xw ≡ nXH + (1 − n)XF.
Equation (17) refers to the IS equation, written in terms of the union con-
sumption8 and nominal interest-rate gaps. Equations (18H) and (18F) are
country-speciﬁc aggregate demand equations, with sc being the steady-state
consumption share of output and qt being the terms-of-trade gap (≡   Tt −   Tt).
These three equations constitute the aggregate demand-side block of the model
and were derived from log-linearization of equations (7H), (7F), (8), (9) and
(10).
The aggregate supply-side block of the model was obtained from the log-
7This deﬁnition does not apply for the inﬂation rates, as stable prices are optimal under
sticky prices.




9linear approximation of equations (13) and (14), as well as from their Foreign
counterparts, around the eﬃcient steady state equilibrium. Equations (19H)
and (19F) are open-economy pure New-Keynesian aggregate supply (AS) curves.
Positive gaps on the terms-of-trade, consumption and public spending have in-
ﬂationary consequences at H: an increase in the demand for H-produced goods
leads to more work eﬀort, and, thus, raises marginal costs. Moreover, the pos-
itive gaps on the terms-of-trade and on the consumption exert an additional
inﬂationary pressure as they reduce the marginal utility of nominal income
for households. The eﬃcient tax rate   τ
i
t, used to compute the tax rate gap
(τi
t =   τ
i
t −  τ
i
t) in country i, is deﬁned as the tax rate required to fully oﬀset the
impact of an idiosyncratic "cost-push" (wage markup) shock.9 Equation (20)
is the terms-of-trade gap’s identity, reﬂecting the inﬂation diﬀerential and the
one-period change in the eﬃcient level of the terms-of-trade (  Tt −   Tt−1).
The ﬁnal equations, (21H) and (21F), are the government budget constraints
relevant for the equilibrium allocation only in the second ﬁscal policy scenario.
Shocks impinge on debt accumulation and create “ﬁscal stress” through their
eﬀects on the eﬃcient equilibrium.10
In sum, in the ﬁrst balanced-budget policy scenario, given the path for policy
instruments and the initial value of   Tt−1, the system including equations (17)-






qt. In the second policy scenario, where policymakers are constrained to ensure
debt sustainability, equations (21H) and (21F) add to the previous system to
describe the economic structure of the economy.
2.3.3 Policy Objectives - The Social Planner’s Problem
The optimal allocation for the monetary union as a whole, in any given period
t, can be described as the solution to the following social planner’s problem,
where the single policy authority is willing to maximize the discounted sum of
the utility ﬂows of the households belonging to the whole union (W):
9The steady-state tax rates are given by τi = (1 − β) b
i
Y + (1 − sc) and the eﬃcient tax
rates by   τi
t = −1−τi
τi    i
w,t, for i = H,F.




































































































































The social planner will choose to produce equal quantities of the diﬀerent
goods in each country. Moreover, the aggregation over all agents (households,
governments and central bank) cancels out the budget constraints and, thus,
the social planner’s solution is not constrained by them.


































































































































= Y ; CH = CF = C; CH
H = CF
H = nHC; CH
F = CF
F =
11nFC and GH = GF = G.





1 + η[scσ + (1 − sc)ψ]
 
[1 + (1 − sc)ψη]   C
w





H,t −   CH
F,t =   CF
H,t −   CF
F,t = −
ρ(1 + η)
1 + η[scρ + (1 − sc)ψ]
 
  aF

















t −   GH
t =
(1 + η)ψ
1 + η[scρ + (1 − sc)ψ]
 
  aF




To fully deﬁne the gap variables described in section above, we need to deter-
mine the eﬃcient interest rate and terms-of-trade levels. The former follows
directly from the Euler equation, while the latter results from the combination
of equation (30) with the optimal intratemporal household’s allocations


















  Tt = −
1 + η
1 + η[scρ + (1 − sc)ψ]
 
  aF




In the ﬁrst ﬁscal policy scenario (lump-sum taxes warrant balanced budgets)
this eﬃcient allocation corresponds to the decentralized ﬂexible-price equilib-
rium when monopolistic and tax distortions are removed through an employ-
ment subsidy and the implemented government spending rules agree with those
derived under the social planner’s optimization. However, in the second ﬁscal
policy scenario, that union-wide optimal allocation may not be supported as a
ﬂexible-price equilibrium, since ﬁscal policy instruments may have to deviate
from those rules to ensure ﬁscal solvency. Anyway, the policy problem will be
formulated with variables in gaps deﬁned in terms of the eﬃcient outcomes and
the two steady state equilibriums coincide.
Steady state equilibrium In order to avoid the traditional inﬂationary bias
problem arising from an ineﬃciently low steady-state output level, we will as-
sume the existence of an employment subsidy that removes average monopolis-
tic and tax rate distortions. To compute this employment subsidy, observe that
the proﬁt-maximizing H-ﬁrms, in a ﬂexible-price setup, choose the same price






























































To get symmetry in the steady-state levels of the output, consumption,













=   where, as we have
already remarked, the employment subsidy ζ
i is fully ﬁnanced by lump sum
taxes.









and, if the employment subsidy ζ
i is set to match   = 1, the eﬃcient steady-
state output level holds. Hence, the employment subsidy in country i = H,F is
assumed to take the value
ζ
i = 1 −
(θ − 1)
 
1 − τi 
θ w
(35)
The steady-state nominal (and real) interest rate is i =
1−β
β .
2.3.4 Policy Objectives - The Social Loss Function
Benevolent authorities, under full cooperation, seek to maximize welfare for the
monetary union as a whole, W, given, now, the set of equations describing the
eﬀective economic structure dynamics: (17)-(20), in the ﬁrst policy scenario; and
(17)-(21F), in the second policy scenario. This environment enables the deriva-
tion of union-wide optimal stabilization policies, but serves also as a benchmark
to assess alternative policy regimes.
Following Woodford (2003), we compute the second-order approximation
of W around a deterministic steady state. Ignoring the terms independent of
policy and terms of three or higher order, the welfare objective takes the form:








where the per-period social loss function (Lt), similar to the one derived by
Beetsma and Jensen (2004, 2005), is deﬁned as11
11The derivation of the social loss function is available upon request.




















































+ (1 − sc)η
 
, Λgc ≡ 2sc (1 − sc)η,








(1 − αFβ)(1 − αF)
Fluctuations in the consumption and the public spending gaps imply welfare
losses in line with the respective households’ risk aversions (1/σ and 1/ψ) and
with the elasticity of disutility with respect to work eﬀort (η). Inﬂation at H
is more costly the higher the degree of nominal rigidity
 
αH 
, the higher the
elasticity of substitution between H-produced goods (θ) and the higher η. The










At the monetary union level, misallocation of goods also applies for devia-
tions of the terms-of-trade from the respective eﬃcient level. The costs of this
distortion (ΛT) increase with the elasticity of substitution between Home and
Foreign produced goods (ρ), with the steady-state consumption share on output
(sc), with η and decrease with country-size asymmetry. Following an asymmet-
ric technology shock, eﬃciency requires prices to change as to shift the adjust-
ment burden ”equally” across the two countries (Benigno and López-Salido,
2006). This creates a trade-oﬀ between the stabilization of relative prices to the
correspondent eﬃcient levels and the stabilization of inﬂation in both countries
and it provides a rationale for the stabilization role of ﬁscal policy.
The cross-term between the consumption gap and the weighted average gov-
ernment spending gap occurs because positive co-movements between these two
variables cause undesirable ﬂuctuations in the work eﬀort for the monetary union
as a whole, in addition to the eﬀort ﬂuctuations caused by each of these vari-
ables per se. There is also a negative cross-term between the terms of trade gap
and the relative spending gap that is increasing (in absolute value) with η and
ρ, while decreasing with country-size asymmetry. This negative co-movement
arises because a positive terms-of-trade gap rises H-competitiveness which, com-
bined with a negative relative public spending gap (higher public spending at H
than at F), shifts demand towards H-produced goods. As a consequence, work
eﬀort shifts from F- towards H-households (cf. Beetsma and Jensen 2004 and
2005, for these arguments).
142.3.5 Other policy objectives
We also consider that policymakers may have divergent policy objectives. This
is a valid assumption since it is reasonable to conjecture that national (ﬁscal)
authorities are mainly concerned with their own citizens and so, their objective
functions should only comprise the utility of the respective constituencies. Prag-
matically, we approximate the national welfare criteria through welfare losses
obtained from splitting the union-wide loss function.12
We will also consider the case of the delegation of monetary policy to a
weight-conservative central bank by distorting the weights on the inﬂation and
the output terms of the social loss function. This is usually seen as a potential
solution to reduce the time-inconsistency problems of policy stabilization, which
can be aggravated by speciﬁc incentives of the ﬁscal authorities.




































































































We assume that ﬁscal and monetary authorities set their policy instruments in
order to minimize the respective loss functions, given the dynamic structure of
the economies, and that they can engage in various policy games. We will con-
sider, as a benchmark case for policy analysis, that policymakers are benevolent
and cooperate under discretion. To assess the importance of time-consistency,
we also compute the optimal policy solution under commitment. These two
optimizing problems will be solved by using the algorithms in Söderlind (1999).
We also consider discretionary non-cooperative policy games and, depending
on the time of events, we obtain Nash or leadership equilibria. In these diﬀer-
ent setups, the timing of the events is as following: 1) the private sector forms
expectations; 2) the shocks are realized; 3a) the central bank sets the interest
rate; 3b) the ﬁscal authorities choose simultaneously the right amount of ﬁscal
policy instruments. There is a Nash equilibrium, if 3a) and 3b) occur simultane-
12Forlati (2009) provides fully micro-founded welfare criteria for the case of non-coordinated
ﬁscal and monetary policies in a monetary union.
15ously; there is monetary leadership if 3a) occurs before 3b); and, if the order of
these occurrences is reversed, there is a ﬁscal leadership. To solve for these dy-
namic policy games we use the methodology developed by Blake and Kirsanova
(2009) and Kirsanova et al. (2005). The derivation of a numerical algorithm for
the solution of the non-cooperative monetary leadership discretionary game is
deferred to a separate appendix, available upon request.
2.5 Calibration
Our baseline calibration was chosen taking as reference Beetsma and Jensen
(2004, 2005), Benigno (2004), Benigno and López-Salido (2006) and Ferrero
(2009).
The discount factor β is 0.99, which implies a 4% annual basis steady-state
interest rate. The parameter θ, the elasticity of substitution between goods
produced in the same country, is equal to 11, implying a price mark-up of 10%.
In turn, the elasticity of substitution between H and the F produced goods, ρ,
is set at 4.5. We assume σ = ψ = 0.4, which implies a coeﬃcient of risk aversion
for private and public consumption equal to 2.5. The steady-state share of
public consumption in output (1 − sc) is set at 0.25.We parameterize η = 0.47,
implying a labour supply elasticity of 1/0.47.
Our benchmark calibration aims to reﬂect a perfectly symmetric setup from
which we can diverge and assess how country-size asymmetry aﬀects the re-
sults. Hence, we begin by assuming that the two economies in the monetary
union are of equal size (ni = 0.5) and have identical degrees of nominal rigidities  
αH = αF 
. We select a value for α equal to 0.75, in order to get an average
length of price contracts equal to one year. While allowing the relative dimen-
sion of country H to vary from nH = 0.5 to nH = 0.9, country-size asymmetry
is illustrated for nH = 0.8.
To reach a high-debt policy scenario and match the numerical constraint
of the Maastricht Treaty, the yearly steady-state debt-to-output ratio (b/4Y ) is
calibrated to 60%. Finally, we assume that the consumption and the technology
shocks follow an uncorrelated AR(1) process with common persistence of 0.85,
while the wage mark-up shocks are i.i.d., and the standard deviation of the
innovations are equal to 0.01.
3 Policy Analysis
In what follows, we will broadly assume that policymakers engage in optimizing
discretionary policy games. We attempt to draw welfare implications arising
from diﬀerent policy regimes, under the two ﬁscal policy scenarios - with and
without debt constraints.
163.1 Discretionary policy outcomes under cooperation
Strategic interactions between policymakers are absent when they minimize the
social loss function. However, if policymakers are unable to commit relative
to the private sector, strategic interactions between the former and the latter
can lead to meaningful discrepancies between discretionary and commitment
cooperative policy outcomes.
Balanced-budget scenario In the balanced-budget scenario, the traditional
stabilization bias does not occur under discretion because, in every period, dis-
tortionary tax rates can freely adjust to optimally control for national inﬂation
rates. Monetary policy does not face stabilization trade-oﬀs; and an active
ﬁscal policy is only required to stabilize asymmetric technology shocks.13 Fur-
thermore, given that changes in the relative prices have more eﬀect on the
marginal costs and inﬂation rates of the smaller (and more open) economies,
small countries have to engage in more active ﬁscal policies than the larger ones
and, even so, they achieve a worse stabilization performance. Figure 1 details
the responses of key endogenous variables to a 1% negative technology shock
hitting the large country.14 It is apparent that this shock, with a direct positive
eﬀect on the terms-of-trade gap and ineﬃciently shifting demand from the small
(F) to the large (H) country, requires a larger adjustment (increase) of the ﬁscal
policy instruments in the small country. Notwithstanding, this is not enough to
prevent higher inﬂation variability relative to the large country.
13Since variables are deﬁned in gaps, an active policy means that policy instruments deviate
from their eﬃcient values. Tables 1A and 1B show that, with the exception of asymmetric
technology shocks, the feedback coeﬃcients of the ﬁscal and monetary policy rules on shocks
are zero. They also show that only ﬁscal policy instruments react to asymmetric technology
shocks.
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Figure 1: Responses to a 1% negative technology shock at a Large Country (H)
Debt scenario In turn, in the debt scenario, because policy instruments need
to ensure government solvency conditions, policy reactions to shocks face a
trade-oﬀ between short-run stabilization and permanent eﬀects on the welfare-
relevant variables. Consequently, the discretionary outcome exhibits a stabiliza-
tion bias and the solutions under discretion and commitment diverge. In this
scenario, symmetric shocks and idiosyncratic cost-push shocks produce welfare
costs, because budgetary consequences prevent policy instruments from being
set at their eﬃcient levels. Likewise, policy response to country-speciﬁc technol-
ogy shocks now has to balance terms-of-trade distortions against ineﬃciencies
arising from the need to ensure the government inter-temporal solvency condi-
tions.
Indeed, policy stabilization of current eﬀects inﬂicts budgetary consequences
and requires ﬁscal policy instruments to be permanently adjusted to sustain the
new debt stocks. This leads to permanent eﬀects on real welfare-relevant vari-
ables (consumption and government spending gaps), which can be lessened only
at the expenses of higher short-run volatility (stabilization trade-oﬀ). Given the
discounting structure embedded in welfare, the optimal policy solution (com-
18mitment) requires that permanent eﬀects remain, in order to accomplish better
short-run stabilization.15 Nevertheless, in the ﬁrst period, given that private
sector expectations have already been formed, it is optimal to implement a
policy-mix that generates higher inﬂation volatility, but reduces debt conse-
quences and, thus, also allows smaller consumption and government spending
gaps, thereafter. This policy is time-inconsistent because, at any later stage,
policymakers would face the same incentive as that of the ﬁrst period. Time-
inconsistency vanishes only when permanent eﬀects are fully eliminated and all
variables return to their pre-shock levels (discretion).
Furthermore, since the level of government indebtedness aﬀects the relative
eﬀectiveness of the ﬁscal and monetary policy instruments on debt stabilization,
the elimination of permanent eﬀects is achieved diversely when public debts are
small or large, as Leith and Wren-Lewis (2007a) and Stehn and Vines (2008a)
remarked. The larger the steady-state debt-to-output ratios are, the larger is
the impact of monetary policy in the debt-service costs and, thus, the higher
is the incentive to shift monetary policy conduct towards debt stabilization;
conversely, ﬁscal policy instruments — particularly, the tax rate gaps — become
less eﬀective in controlling debt while they become relatively more apt to oﬀ-
set the inﬂationary consequences. For the considered (large) debts, Figure 2
shows that, in face of a symmetric shock simultaneously raising debt and inﬂa-
tion optimal discretionary policy requires a ﬁrst-period cut in the interest rate
gap.16 This policy response is complemented, initially, with a decrease of the
government spending gaps while, depending on the debt-to-output values, tax
rate gaps may increase, to help debt stabilization, or may decrease, to oﬀset
inﬂationary consequences. The resulting debt decline induces a subsequent and
anticipated deﬂationary policy-mix that also assists the control of inﬂation in
the ﬁrst period.
15This result is reminiscent of the tax smoothing result of the optimal taxation literature
(Barro, 1979 and Lucas and Stokey, 1983).
Schmitt-Grohé and Uribe (2004) or Leith and Wren-Lewis (2007a), on closed economy
models, and Ferrero (2009) or Leith and Wren-Lewis (2007b), on open economy models, show
that the optimal policy response to shocks requires permanent variations in the public debt.
16Under our calibration, the interest rate gap rises only for steady-state debt-to-output
ratios lower than 20%.
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Figure 2: Responses to a 1% negative symmetric technology shock, Cooperative
Thus, in the debt scenario, a time-consistency problem emerges, materializ-
ing in a debt stabilization bias, under discretion. This debt stabilization bias
is responsible for the meaningful divergence between debt and balanced-budget
policies.17 The example of a negative technology shock at H is instructive to
better assess this discrepancy. The ﬁrst-period policy response now requires an
increase in the tax rate gap at H and a fall in the interest rate gap and in the
tax rate gap at F that magniﬁes the eﬀects on the inﬂation rates and on the
consumption gap. In a country-size symmetric monetary union, the monetary
policy response increases inﬂation variability at H while reducing it at F. In
general, the country that suﬀers a domestic idiosyncratic technology shock ex-
periences a worse stabilization performance than the other country, in contrast
with the balanced-budget policy scenario, where domestic and foreign shocks
deliver equal stabilization costs (see Figure 3).
17Under commitment, the solutions for the stabilization problem diverge only slightly be-
tween the two policy scenarios.
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Figure 3: Responses to a 1% negative technology shock at H (nH = 0.5)
Moreover, as a smaller country can beneﬁt less from monetary policy debt
accommodation than a larger one, it has to perform a relatively more active ﬁscal
policy towards debt stabilization, with negative welfare consequences. Hence,
the presence of the debt stabilization bias further aggravates the stabilization
performance of a small country relative to that of a large country.
The computations of the social loss under the two policy scenarios (Tables
4A-4B) conﬁrm that: i) welfare costs are larger for both countries under the
debt-constrained scenario; ii) these costs are smaller the higher the degree of
country-size asymmetry is;18 iii) and, the distribution of welfare costs across
countries is even more unfavourable to the small country under the debt sce-
nario.
3.2 Discretionary policy outcomes under non-cooperative
regimes
Non-cooperation allows for strategic interactions between policymakers. Diﬀer-
ent policy objectives, the order of playing (Nash, monetary leadership or ﬁscal
18In fact, larger country-size asymmetry implies a more symmetric structure of shocks at
the union level.
21leadership) and the relative size of each country crucially shape such interac-
tions.
Relative to cooperation, ﬁscal authorities now face the following incentives
(I): (I1) they use more (less) actively ﬁscal policy instruments that cause nega-
tive (positive) cross-border eﬀects; (I2) ﬁscal policy is more (less) active when
it causes a negative (positive) externality on the aggregate variables to which
monetary policy reacts; and, (I3) a larger country, causing larger externalities,
moderates its ﬁscal policy while the smaller one faces the reverse incentive.
Balanced-budget scenario As in the cooperative arrangement, the asym-
metric technology shock is the only one causing policy trade-oﬀs. In face of
such a shock, the tax rate and the government spending responses alleviate the
impact on the domestic inﬂation rates but accentuate the eﬀect of the shock
on the terms-of-trade gap. The latter produces a negative eﬀect in the other
country which, by not being fully internalized, implies a more active use of ﬁscal
policy instruments (I1).
With equal-size countries, the non-internalization of these cross-border ef-
fects does not generate a free-riding problem between national ﬁscal authorities
and the central bank: the eﬀects of their (symmetric) actions on union-wide
variables cancel out. When it leads, the central bank anticipates this outcome
and, thus, the monetary leadership and the Nash solutions coincide. On the
other hand, under ﬁscal leadership, each ﬁscal authority perceives that the cen-
tral bank, internalizing the negative ﬁscal policy externalities, will react to an
excessive policy response. As a consequence, both governments moderate their
ﬁscal policy responses, moving closer to the cooperative outcome (cf. the ﬁs-
cal policy feedback coeﬃcients on aH in Table 1A). Therefore, among the non-
cooperative regimes, the ﬁscal leadership delivers the lowest welfare stabilization
costs (Table 4A, nH = 0.5).
Country-size asymmetry is the only reason for national ﬁscal authorities
to experience diﬀerentiated incentives: as a larger country has more impact
on the union-wide variables, to which central bank reacts, ﬁscal authorities
of large countries moderate their policies while those of small countries face
the reverse incentive (I3). This asymmetric conduct impinges on union-wide
variables and forces monetary policy to complement the large (H) country’s
ﬁscal policy response to idiosyncratic technology shocks (Table 1B). Even so,
the small country (by making use of a socially costless policy instrument - the tax
rate) achieves a better stabilization of its inﬂation rate, under non-cooperation
(see Figure 1).
Columns 1 and 2 of Table 1B show that, relative to Nash, ﬁscal leadership
further exacerbates the activism of the small country, particularly with respect
to the use of the tax rate, while it further restrains that of the large country. As
a result, monetary policy has to become relatively more active. On the other
hand, under monetary leadership, the central bank, perceiving the opposite
incentives for each country and how they impact on aggregate variables, lessens
its response to shocks to force a more (less) active ﬁscal policy by the large
22(small) country.
Table 4A shows that policy cooperation always dominates non-cooperation
for the monetary union, but it is the worst outcome for the small country.
The table also shows that, among the non-cooperative policy regimes and for
all countries, ﬁscal leadership delivers the best stabilization performance, when
country-size asymmetry is not excessive; in turn, the monetary leadership out-
come is superior only for a suﬃciently high degree of country-size asymmetry
(nH ￿ 0.85).
Debt scenario In this scenario, the need to ensure ﬁscal solvency ampliﬁes
the sources of strategic interactions between policies. Now, even with equal-size
countries, ﬁscal policies always impinge on aggregate variables to which mone-
tary policy reacts. Consider a negative technology shock at H which, because
it leads to stronger policy trade-oﬀs and exhibits more persistence, is key to
welfare results. Compared with cooperation, the ﬁrst-period reaction to such
a shock implies a smaller variation of the tax rate gap and a larger response
of the government spending gap in both countries, because of their opposite
cross-border eﬀects (I1). Furthermore, since the domestic (foreign) ﬁscal policy
reaction causes a positive (negative) externality on the union-wide debt (I2),
non-cooperation leads to a relatively less (more) active policy (towards debt
adjustment) at H (F). Overall, aggregate ﬁscal policy ends up looser than in
cooperation and, thus, the central bank is forced into a more expansionary
monetary policy in order to ensure aggregate debt adjustment.19 Hence, the in-
ﬂationary stance of monetary policy, in a high-debt monetary union, aggravates
under non-cooperation. Relative to Nash, ﬁscal leadership magniﬁes this prob-
lem while monetary leadership mitigates it. Under ﬁscal leadership, being aware
of the monetary policy reaction against debt misalignments, ﬁscal authorities
become less disciplined. In turn, a central bank with a ﬁrst-mover advantage,
anticipating this free-riding behaviour, restricts monetary policy and compels
national governments to act closer to the cooperative outcome.20 Consequently,
because ﬁscal policy cross-border eﬀects are not internalized and because mon-
etary policy’s time-consistency problem is ampliﬁed, non-cooperative regimes
inﬂict larger welfare stabilization costs. However, and unlike the balanced-
budget scenario, ﬁscal leadership delivers the worst welfare outcome, as the
beneﬁt from ﬁscal policy moderation (less ﬁscal discipline) is overturned by the
time-consistency requirement to adjust aggregate debt to its pre-shock level.
In turn, monetary leadership pushes non-cooperative towards the cooperative
outcome, yielding lower welfare costs (see Table 4B, nH = 0.5).
Considering now country-size asymmetry, the incentives faced by each gov-
ernment depend not only on the type but also on the size of the externalities
19This can be checked by computing, across policy regimes, the aggregate government spend-
ing and tax rate responses to an idiosyncratic negative technology shock at H, using the
feedback coeﬃcients on Table 2. Similar conclusions apply to the case of a country-speciﬁc
positive cost-push shock.
20This manifests, relative to Nash, in a more active ﬁscal policy at H and less active ﬁscal
policy at F (cf. feedback coeﬃcients on aH in Table 2, across policy regimes).
23caused by ﬁscal policy. As in the balanced-budget scenario, small countries,
causing small externalities, have incentives to engage in more active ﬁscal poli-
cies than under cooperation (I3). However, this additional activism moves to-
wards debt-stabilization, with negative consequences for macroeconomic sta-
bilization. Large countries, expecting domestic debt-accommodation from the
common monetary policy, face the reverse incentives. As a consequence, they
undertake less active ﬁscal policies (towards debt management) under non-
cooperation, achieving a better stabilization performance.
Since it aggravates the debt stabilization bias of the ﬁscal policy of the small
country while mitigating that of the large country, non-cooperation makes the
stabilization burden across the union countries more asymmetric. To reduce
such asymmetry, the central bank accommodates the budgetary consequences of
the small country relatively more than it would do under cooperation, while tak-
ing the converse attitude relative to the large country (cf. the monetary feedback
coeﬃcients on debts and shocks at Table 3, cooperation vs. non-cooperation).
In eﬀect, non-cooperation alleviates the time-consistency problems associated
with the stabilization of a shock hitting the large country while it aggravates
those of a shock hitting the small country, as is apparent from examination of
Figures 4 and 5. In fact, Figure 4 shows that, relative to cooperation, the Nash
monetary policy response to a negative technology shock hitting a large coun-
try is less debt-accommodative.21 As a consequence, the union-wide and the
H (large country) inﬂation rates exhibit lower volatility. Conversely, the mon-
etary policy response to such a shock in the small country (Figure 5) is looser
under Nash, causing higher volatility on the union-wide and F (small country)
inﬂation rates. The net eﬀect for the welfare of the large (H) country is positive
because, in both cases, this country achieves better stabilization of its inﬂation
rate, under Nash.
21This occurs because although this shock has a positive eﬀect on aggregate debt it has a
negative impact on the small country’s debt, which determines a small ﬁrst-period reduction
on the interest rate gap, under non-cooperation.
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Figure 4: Responses to a 1% negative technology shock at H
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Figure 5: Responses to a 1% negative technology shock at F
25Fiscal leadership further moderates the ﬁscal policy response of the large
country to debt consequences, since monetary policy is expected to adjust do-
mestic debt. In turn, monetary leadership enhances ﬁscal discipline for the
large country, as the central bank, anticipating the incentives, accommodates
its budgetary consequences less.22
The welfare losses reported in Table 4B show that, in general, both the union
and the small country lose with non-cooperation when country-size asymmetry
is not too high (nH < 0.85). Fiscal leadership delivers the worst stabilization
performance for the union and the small country, while it is the most favoured
regime for the large country, which beneﬁts from a larger strategic position vis-
à-vis the central bank. Under non-cooperation, there are obvious social welfare
stabilization gains from having a benevolent central bank as a ﬁrst mover.
3.3 The case for a conservative central bank
Either because of the opposition of the larger country in the debt-constrained
framework, or because it may be politically unappealing, the cooperative solu-
tion may be unfeasible; furthermore, time-consistency problems cause expressive
welfare stabilization costs, under the debt scenario. In this context, an analysis
of wether alternative institutional devices could improve on the non-cooperative
discretionary outcomes for the whole union is, thus, in order.
A typical institutional solution is to delegate monetary policy to a conserva-
tive central bank. According to the literature, and in the context of pure mone-
tary policy models, a conservative central bank unambiguously delivers welfare
gains (see, among others, Rogoﬀ, 1985, and Clarida et al., 1999). However, in
the context of models combining monetary and ﬁscal policies, the presence of
a conservative central bank may not be strictly welfare-enhancing (see, for in-
stance, Dixit and Lambertini, 2003, Adam and Billi, 2006, Blake and Kirsanova,
2009, and Stehn and Vines, 2008b).
In the balanced-budget scenario, where a cooperative solution under commit-
ment coincides with that under discretion, a weight-conservative central bank
may only correct distortions arising from the lack of policy cooperation. How-
ever, such welfare gains proved to be null under monetary leadership while, un-
der ﬁscal leadership, monetary conservatism turns out to be welfare-improving
only if the degree of country-size asymmetry is not too high23 (nH < 0.7, Table
4A).
In the debt scenario, delegating monetary policy to a conservative central
bank gains an additional rationale: it can reduce distortions generated by the
lack of commitment of ﬁscal and monetary policies. Intuitively, an inﬂation-
averse central bank is more eﬀective in controlling for inﬂation expectations
22It is clear from Table 3 that, relative to Nash and in response to a negative technology
shock at H, the government spending gap falls less (more) and the tax rate gap decreases
by more (less) at H in ﬁscal leadership (monetary leadership). Hence, in ﬁscal leadership
(monetary leadership) the ﬁscal policy of the large country is globally more loose (tight).
23The conservative central bank moderates the large country’s ﬁscal policy reaction to
shocks, but exacerbates that of the small country.
26and, thus, it may improve the short-run trade-oﬀ between inﬂation and output
stabilization. However, central bank conservatism can have a perverse eﬀect as it
may strengthen the incentives to reduce the permanent eﬀects on debt, because
inﬂation costs diminish in the ﬁrst period. A more aggressive monetary policy
response to debt displacement, further cutting debt below its pre-shock level in
the ﬁrst period, allows a more eﬀective deﬂationary policy in subsequent periods
and, thus, enables better control of inﬂation in the ﬁrst period. Therefore,
delegating monetary policy to a weight-conservative central bank in a high-
debt monetary union may aggravate the time-consistency problem of monetary
policy, as it becomes more reactive to debt misalignments; moreover, it may
exacerbate the strategic interactions between ﬁscal and monetary authorities,
due to conﬂicting objectives.
In fact, our experiments conﬁrm that, in an equal-size country monetary
union, a conservative central bank has tighter control over debt while overall
ﬁscal policy indiscipline increases (cf. the monetary policy feedback coeﬃcients
on shocks under a benevolent and a conservative central bank in Table 2). Each
country experiences better stabilization of domestic idiosyncratic shocks, be-
cause the stabilization of its own inﬂation beneﬁts from the central bank’s con-
servative reputation and from the lessening of domestic ﬁscal discipline; on the
other hand, external shocks cause higher welfare stabilization costs, under a con-
servative central bank. This is welfare-decreasing under monetary leadership,
where monetary policy overreaction to debt displacement is further exacerbated.
In turn, to counteract the monetary authority’s excessive concern with inﬂation
volatility, leading ﬁscal authorities restrict their free-riding behaviours; there-
fore, ﬁscal leadership reduces the union-wide ﬁscal indiscipline and moderates
the budgetary accommodation stance of the monetary policy.24 Comparing wel-
fare losses under a benevolent and a conservative central bank, Table 4B shows
that the latter is welfare-enhancing only under ﬁscal leadership: a conservative
central bank contributes meaningfully to reduce distortions generated by home-
biased ﬁscal policy objectives while not excessively aggravating the monetary
policy debt-stabilization bias. 25
In general, these results also apply to the case of country-size asymmetry:
delegating monetary policy to a conservative central bank improves the welfare
of the union only under ﬁscal leadership. However, in this case, the incentives
each ﬁscal authority faces do not parallel and, therefore, the welfare implications
do not spread proportionally across countries. For instance, with our calibra-
24Looking at the policy feedback coeﬃcients on shocks (Table 2), it is easy to check that,
with a conservative central bank, monetary policy is relatively more debt-accommodative
under monetary leadership than under ﬁscal leadership while the reverse occurs with a benev-
olent monetary authority. The costly game between a leading conservative central bank and
national ﬁscal authorities perversely generates higher inﬂation variability than in the corre-
sponding benevolent policy scenario.
25We have also computed the welfare losses when ﬁscal authorities cooperate against a con-
servative central bank and we found that the losses are higher than with a benevolent central
bank. We can infer that the gain from a conservative central bank under ﬁscal leadership with
non-cooperative ﬁscal authorities follows exclusively from the attenuation of the ﬁscal policy
free-riding problem.
27tion, a conservative central bank may produce welfare gains for the union as a
whole, as well as for the small country, at the expense of a worse stabilization
performance for the larger one (Table 4B).
4 Concluding Remarks
This paper has explored the interactions between monetary and ﬁscal stabi-
lization policies in a micro-founded macroeconomic dynamic model for a mon-
etary union with country-size asymmetry, under two opposite policy scenarios:
a balanced-budget and a high-debt scenario. The former, magniﬁes the ﬁscal
policy stabilization role and minimizes the sources of strategic interactions; the
latter, substantially lessens the ﬁscal policy stabilization eﬀort and, because of
the enhanced eﬀectiveness of monetary policy to control public debt, ampliﬁes
the risk of harmful policy-mixes.26
We found that a small country performs a more active ﬁscal policy than a
large one and that non-cooperation accentuates this activism while moderating
that of a large country. This discloses higher stabilization costs for the union as
a whole, while producing opposite welfare consequences for the small and the
large country. In a debt-unconstrained policy scenario, small countries beneﬁt
from their extra ﬁscal policy activism, under non-cooperation, but cooperation
dominates for the larger ones; thus, the best outcome for the union (coopera-
tion) would be more likely to emerge. Conversely, in a high debt-constrained
scenario welfare decreases for the small countries and improves for the larger
ones, under non-cooperation, as a more active ﬁscal policy means a more active
policy towards debt stabilization (debt stabilization bias); thus, the best out-
come for the union (cooperation) would hardly emerge. Indebted large countries
may strongly oppose to a cooperative arrangement in favour to ﬁscal leadership
where they can explore a larger strategic power vis-à-vis a debt-accommodative
central bank. In this case, delegation of monetary policy to a more conservative
central bank could be a fruitful device to improve the welfare of the union as a
whole.
In future research we intend to derive the benevolent non-cooperative country-
speciﬁc loss functions and, additionally, include micro-founded political economy
motivations to mimic the actual behaviour of ﬁscal policy authorities. Another
possible extension stems from the need to represent more realistically a monetary
union composed of many small countries and few large ones. Our two-country
model is a good starting point in accounting for country-size asymmetry, but it
can be improved by describing part of the union as a continuum of small open
economies, as Galí and Monacelli (2008) do for a monetary union as a whole.
In the EMU, the majority of the country-members are small compared with the
union as a whole, and so, taken in isolation, their policy decisions have negligible
aggregate impacts.
26In our model, this second eﬀect is possibly overestimated, since all government debt has
a one-period maturity; this lends monetary policy high leverage over debt service.
28Appendix: Monetary leadership and Nash be-
tween the ﬁscal authorities
This appendix summarizes the iterative dynamic programming algorithm for
the discretionary monetary leadership case when ﬁscal authorities play a Nash
between them. This is an extension of the algorithms developed by Oudiz and
Sachs (1985) and Backus and Driﬃll (1986) and popularized by Söderlind (1999).
It closely follows the one developed by Kirsanova et al. (2005).
There are ﬁve strategic agents in the game: three explicit players - the mon-
etary and the two ﬁscal authorities - and two implicit players - the private sector
of both countries - that always act in last. In this type of game, the monetary
authority moves ﬁrst and sets the interest rate. Then the two ﬁscal authorities
decide the levels of their ﬁscal policy instruments. Finally, the private sector in
both countries reacts being the ultimate follower.
To solve this type of game, one inverts the order of playing and begins by
solving the optimization of the last player, ending up with the optimization of
the leader (the ﬁrst player). The private sector’s optimization problem is already
solved out - the system of equations in section 2 - and can be represented by
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(38)
where Yt is an n1-vector of predetermined state variables, Y0 is given, and
Xt are the eﬀective instruments of the private sector, an n2-vector of non-
predetermined or forward-looking variables (n = n1 + n2 ). The policy in-





t stand for the
instruments of the followers which are, respectively, the Home and the Foreign
ﬁscal authorities, while UM
t represents the instrument of the leader, which is
the monetary authority. εt+1 is an nε-vector of exogenous zero-mean iid shocks
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where A =   A−1
0   A, B =   A−1
0   B, D =   A−1
0   D and C =   A−1
0   C. The covariance
matrix of the shocks to Yt+1 is CC′ and matrices A, B, C, and D are partioned





















29A common special case is when H ≡ I, but in general this matrix need not
to be invertible. This system describes the evolution of the economy as observed
by policymakers.
The followers’ optimization problem
In the discretionary case, the three policymakers reoptimize every period by
taking the process by which private agents form their expectations as given - and
where the expectations are consistent with actual policies (Söderlind 1999). The
two Nash ﬁscal authorities minimize their loss functions treating the monetary
policy instrument as parametric but incorporating the reaction functions of the






























t is the target variables for the Home ﬁscal authority while QH is
the corresponding matrix of weights. The target variables can be rewritten in
terms of the predetermined and non-predetermined state variables collected on
vector Zt, in terms of the policy instruments (Ut) and in terms of combinations
of these two variables.
The ﬁscal authority in H optimizes every period, taking into account that she
will be able to reoptimize next period. The model is linear-quadratic, thus the









H is a positive semideﬁnite matrix and
wH
t+1 is a scalar independent of Yt+1. Moreover, the forward looking variables
must be linear functions of the state variables, Xt+1 = −Nt+1Yt+1. Hence, the


























t+1, eq. (39) and Yt given.
Rewriting the system by using EtXt+1 = −Nt+1EtYt+1 Using the expres-
sion above to substitute into the upper block of (39), we get
EtXt+1 = −Nt+1
 





while the lower block of (39) is




Multiplying the former equation by H, setting the result equal to the latter
equation and solving for Xt we obtain
Xt = -(A22+HNt+1A12)
−1 (A21+HNt+1A11)





























where Jt is n2xn1, KH
t is n2xkH, KF
t is n2xkF and KM
t is n2xkM (kH and kF
stand respectively for the number of ﬁscal policy instruments of H and F, while
kM stands for the number of monetary policy instruments)27.
The evolution of Yt Use (42) in the ﬁrst n1 equations in the system(39) to
get the reduced form evolution of the predetermined variables
Yt+1 = [A11 − A12Jt]




























Yt+1 = OYtYt + OHtUH
t + OFtUF
t + OMtUM
t + C1εt+1 (43)
Being a follower, the Home ﬁscal authority observes monetary authority’s ac-
tions and reacts to them. In a linear-quadratic setup, the optimal solution
belongs to the class of linear feedback rules of the form:
UH
t = −FH




t denotes feedback coeﬃcients on the predetermined state variables
and LH




t Yt − LF
t UM
t (45)
Being in a Nash game, the two ﬁscal authorities do not respond to each other’s
actions.
27It is assumed that A22 + HNt+1A12 is invertible.
31The monetary leadership authority takes into account these ﬁscal policy
reaction functions as well as the private sector’s optimal conditions, when solves
its optimization problem. Thus, the leader can manipulate the follower by





Reformulated optimization problem Therefore we can substitute eqs.




































































































































































































































































































28We have make use of the fact that wH
t+1 is independent of Yt+1 and Etεt+1 = 0.
32Hence, the problem faced by the Home ﬁscal authority has been transformed to
a standard linear-quadratic regulator problem without forward looking variables














































t Yt − LF
t UM
t , the ﬁrst-order
condition can be solved for the feedback coeﬃcients of the reaction function of























































Finding the recursive equation for St
H Substituting the decision rules


















































































































































































Similar formulae can be derived for country F.
The leader’s optimization problem This part of the problem is the stan-











































But, since the leadership integrates the followers’ reaction functions - UH
t =
−FH




t Yt − LF
t UM
t - into its optimization problem,
the leadership’s loss function as to be rewritten in terms of the relevant variables
for the leadership authority. Since
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 where   KM = C′CM′QMCM
      
KM
C







The iterative procedure We start with initial approximation for the mon-
etary policy rule, FM





F , some (e.g. a matrix of zeros) N(0) and solve the fol-
lower’s problem, using Eq. (2 − 50) for country H and equivalent equations for
country F. We get FH
(0) and LH
(0), as well as FF
(0) and LF





F . We then take into account the policy reaction functions of











and solve the problem for the monetary
authority. This will give us the monetary policy reaction function, FM
(1), and
updated matrices N(1) and S
(1)
M . Then, we again solve the problem for the ﬁscal








(1) and so on. The
ﬁxed point is found when the policy rules and the matrices converge towards
constants for a given level of tolerance.
Blake and Kirsanova (2010) have examined the existence of multiple dis-
cretionary equilibria in dynamic linear quadratic rational expectations models.
They show that diﬀerent initializations of the Oudiz and Sachs (1985) and of
the Backus and Driﬃll (1986) algorithms can converge to diﬀerent solutions.
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it 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
gH
t 0.1622 -0.1622 0.0000 0.0000 -0.1532 0.1532 -0.2745
Coop τH
t 1.4001 -1.4001 0.0000 0.0000 -1.3224 1.3224 -2.3688
gF
t -0.1622 0.1622 0.0000 0.0000 0.1532 -0.1532 0.2745
τF
t -1.4001 1.4001 0.0000 0.0000 1.3224 -1.3224 2.3688
it 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
gH
t 0.1655 -0.1655 0.0000 0.0000 -0.1600 0.1600 -0.2866
Nash τH
t 1.7869 -1.7869 0.0000 0.0000 -1.7855 1.7855 -3.1985
gF
t -0.1655 0.1655 0.0000 0.0000 0.1600 -0.1600 0.2866
τF
t -1.7869 1.7869 0.0000 0.0000 1.7855 -1.7855 3.1985
it 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
gH
t 0.1607 -0.1607 0.0000 0.0000 -0.1481 0.1481 -0.2653
FL τH
t 1.7178 -1.7178 0.0000 0.0000 -1.7120 1.7120 -3.0668
gF
t -0.1607 0.1607 0.0000 0.0000 0.1481 -0.1481 0.2653
τF
t -1.7178 1.7178 0.0000 0.0000 1.7120 -1.7120 3.0668
it 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
gH
t 0.1655 -0.1655 0.0000 0.0000 -0.1600 0.1600 -0.2866
ML τH
t 1.7869 -1.7869 0.0000 0.0000 -1.7855 1.7855 -3.1985
gF
t -0.1655 0.1655 0.0000 0.0000 0.1600 -0.1600 0.2866
τF
t -1.7869 1.7869 0.0000 0.0000 1.7855 -1.7855 3.1985
Table 1B: Policy reaction functions, Balanced-budget, nH = 0.8
it 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
gH
t 0.0649 -0.0649 0.0000 0.0000 -0.0613 0.0613 -0.1098
Coop τH
t 0.5601 -0.5601 0.0000 0.0000 -0.5289 0.5289 -0.9475
gF
t -0.2596 0.2596 0.0000 0.0000 0.2452 -0.2452 0.4392
τF
t -2.2402 2.2402 0.0000 0.0000 2.1158 -2.1158 3.7900
it -0.0209 0.0209 0.0000 0.0000 0.0205 -0.0205 0.0367
gH
t 0.0615 -0.0615 0.0000 0.0000 -0.0489 0.0489 -0.0876
Nash τH
t 0.3149 -0.3149 0.0000 0.0000 0.3419 -0.3419 0.6124
gF
t -0.2719 0.2719 0.0000 0.0000 0.2746 -0.2746 0.4919
τF
t -3.4803 3.4803 0.0000 0.0000 4.0882 -4.0882 7.3232
it -0.0234 0.0234 0.0000 0.0000 0.0234 -0.0234 0.0419
gH
t 0.0592 -0.0592 0.0000 0.0000 -0.0422 0.0422 -0.0755
FL τH
t 0.2580 -0.2580 0.0000 0.0000 0.4488 -0.4488 0.8040
gF
t -0.2704 0.2704 0.0000 0.0000 0.2696 -0.2696 0.4830
τF
t -3.4857 3.4857 0.0000 0.0000 4.1320 -4.1320 7.4017
it -0.0021 0.0021 0.0000 0.0000 0.0074 -0.0074 0.0133
gH
t 0.0667 -0.0667 0.0000 0.0000 -0.0648 0.0648 -0.1161
ML τH
t 0.6477 -0.6477 0.0000 0.0000 -0.6695 0.6695 -1.1993
gF
t -0.2667 0.2667 0.0000 0.0000 0.2592 -0.2592 0.4643
τF






























it 0.6826 0.6826 -0.1734 -0.1734 0.2921 -0.0000 0.0000 -0.0000 -0.5733 -0.5733
gH
t 0.3391 -0.1862 -0.0497 0.0109 0.0327 -0.2053 0.2053 -0.3678 -0.1644 0.0359
C τH
t -2.4114 2.0082 1.0910 -0.9886 -0.0863 0.6206 -0.6206 1.1117 3.6068 -3.2681
gF
t -0.1862 0.3391 0.0109 -0.0497 0.0327 0.2053 -0.2053 0.3678 0.0359 -0.1644
τF
t 2.0082 -2.4114 -0.9886 1.0910 -0.0863 -0.6206 0.6206 -1.1117 -3.2681 3.6068
it 0.7520 0.7520 -0.1911 -0.1911 0.3218 -0.0000 0.0000 -0.0000 -0.6316 -0.6316
gH
t 0.3594 -0.2256 -0.0471 0.0131 0.0286 -0.2269 0.2269 -0.4065 -0.1557 0.0433
N τH
t -0.0943 1.1465 0.5464 -0.8137 0.2251 -1.8627 1.8627 -3.3366 1.8061 -2.6899
gF
t -0.2256 0.3594 0.0131 -0.0471 0.0286 0.2269 -0.2269 0.4065 0.0433 -0.1557
τF
t 1.1465 -0.0943 -0.8137 0.5464 0.2251 1.8627 -1.8627 3.3366 -2.6899 1.8061
it 0.7524 0.7524 -0.1912 -0.1912 0.3220 0.0000 -0.0000 0.0000 -0.6320 -0.6320
gH
t 0.3396 -0.2056 -0.0437 0.0097 0.0287 -0.1830 0.1830 -0.3278 -0.1445 0.0320
FL τH
t 0.3780 0.6837 0.4446 -0.7143 0.2272 -2.6778 2.6778 -4.7968 1.4696 -2.3613
gF
t -0.2056 0.3396 0.0097 -0.0437 0.0287 0.1830 -0.1830 0.3278 0.0320 -0.1445
τF
t 0.6837 0.3780 -0.7143 0.4446 0.2272 2.6778 -2.6778 4.7968 -2.3613 1.4696
it 0.6932 0.6932 -0.1761 -0.1761 0.2966 -0.0000 0.0000 -0.0000 -0.5823 -0.5823
gH
t 0.3627 -0.2208 -0.0479 0.0119 0.0304 -0.2350 0.2350 -0.4210 -0.1584 0.0392
ML τH
t -0.3669 1.0894 0.6066 -0.7901 0.1546 -1.5500 1.5500 -2.7766 2.0052 -2.6120
gF
t -0.2208 0.3627 0.0119 -0.0479 0.0304 0.2350 -0.2350 0.4210 0.0392 -0.1584
τF
t 1.0894 -0.3669 -0.7901 0.6066 0.1546 1.5500 -1.5500 2.7766 -2.6120 2.0052
Conservative central bank: ρ = 0.75;1 − ρ = 0.25
it 0.8456 0.8456 -0.2148 -0.2148 0.3618 -0.0000 0.0000 -0.0000 -0.7102 -0.7102
gH
t 0.3288 -0.1970 -0.0417 0.0082 0.0282 -0.1840 0.1840 -0.3297 -0.1377 0.0270
FL τH
t 0.4267 1.0540 0.4307 -0.8069 0.3168 -2.4089 2.4089 -4.3150 1.4239 -2.6676
gF
t -0.1970 0.3288 0.0082 -0.0417 0.0282 0.1840 -0.1840 0.3297 0.0270 -0.1377
τF
t 1.0540 0.4267 -0.8069 0.4307 0.3168 2.4089 -2.4089 4.3150 -2.6676 1.4239
it 0.8895 0.8895 -0.2260 -0.2260 0.3807 0.0000 -0.0000 0.0000 -0.7472 -0.7472
gH
t 0.3523 -0.2355 -0.0453 0.0156 0.0250 -0.2119 0.2119 -0.3796 -0.1497 0.0516
ML τH
t 0.5041 1.3272 0.4082 -0.8735 0.3918 -2.3922 2.3922 -4.2853 1.3495 -2.8878
gF
t -0.2355 0.3523 0.0156 -0.0453 0.0250 0.2119 -0.2119 0.3796 0.0516 -0.1497
τF
t 1.3272 0.5041 -0.8735 0.4082 0.3918 2.3922 -2.3922 4.2853 -2.8878 1.3495






























it 1.0921 0.2730 -0.2775 -0.0694 0.2921 -0.0000 0.0000 -0.0000 -0.9173 -0.2293
gH
t 0.2274 -0.0745 -0.0432 0.0043 0.0327 -0.0821 0.0821 -0.1471 -0.1428 0.0144
Coop τH
t -1.2065 0.8033 0.4979 -0.3954 -0.0863 0.2482 -0.2482 0.4447 1.6459 -1.3072
gF
t -0.2978 0.4508 0.0174 -0.0562 0.0327 0.3285 -0.3285 0.5885 0.0574 -0.1859
τF
t 3.2131 -3.6163 -1.5817 1.6842 -0.0863 -0.9929 0.9929 -1.7786 -5.2289 5.5676
it 0.9293 0.5793 -0.2338 -0.1495 0.3228 -3.1787 3.1787 -5.6940 -0.7730 -0.4942
gH
t 0.1456 -0.0272 -0.0242 -0.0059 0.0253 -0.3065 0.3065 -0.5490 -0.0800 -0.0194
Nash τH
t 1.4286 -0.5334 -0.0721 -0.1553 0.1915 -3.5439 3.5439 -6.3482 -0.2384 -0.5135
gF
t -0.4296 0.5744 0.0210 -0.0578 0.0310 0.4076 -0.4076 0.7302 0.0694 -0.1910
τF
t 6.8594 -5.5344 -1.6558 1.3191 0.2835 -16.9330 16.9330 -30.3325 -5.4738 4.3608
it 0.9368 0.5749 -0.2294 -0.1547 0.3234 -2.9852 2.9852 -5.3476 -0.7584 -0.5113
gH
t 0.1364 -0.0178 -0.0226 -0.0075 0.0254 -0.2692 0.2692 -0.4823 -0.0747 -0.0249
FL τH
t 1.7470 -0.8120 -0.1151 -0.1225 0.2001 -4.0777 4.0777 -7.3045 -0.3805 -0.4048
gF
t -0.4037 0.5484 0.0172 -0.0539 0.0310 0.3051 -0.3051 0.5466 0.0568 -0.1783
τF
t 6.1141 -4.7821 -1.5078 1.1694 0.2850 -13.0557 13.0557 -23.3871 -4.9846 3.8657
it 0.6527 0.7404 -0.1957 -0.1582 0.2981 -3.0052 3.0052 -5.3833 -0.6471 -0.5231
gH
t 0.1457 -0.0265 -0.0239 -0.0064 0.0255 -0.3578 0.3578 -0.6408 -0.0789 -0.0212
ML τH
t 1.2850 -0.4787 -0.0305 -0.1744 0.1725 -3.7175 3.7175 -6.6592 -0.1008 -0.5765
gF
t -0.4309 0.5880 0.0230 -0.0629 0.0336 0.3051 -0.3051 0.5465 0.0761 -0.2080
τF
t 6.3608 -5.4950 -1.6520 1.4320 0.1853 -14.6393 14.6393 -26.2237 -5.4611 4.7339
40Table 4A: Losses − H and F households (LH, LF) and union-wide (L) − Balanced-Budget
nH=0.5 nH=0.55 nH=0.6 nH=0.65 nH=0.7 nH=0.75 nH=0.8 nH=0.85 nH=0.9
LCoop 3.8078 3.7697 3.6555 3.4651 3.1985 2.8558 2.4370 1.9420 1.3708
LML 3.9479 3.9129 3.8075 3.6306 3.3800 3.0526 2.6438 2.1473 1.5534
LFL 3.8942 3.8617 3.7635 3.5973 3.3595 3.0450 2.6470 2.1569 1.5639
LN 3.9479 3.9137 3.8106 3.6371 3.3904 3.0665 2.6599 2.1631 1.5658
LHCoop 3.8078 3.6989 3.5296 3.2999 3.0097 2.6592 2.2482 1.7768 1.2449
LHML 3.9479 3.9334 3.8441 3.6790 3.4358 3.1114 2.7011 2.1982 1.5931
LHFL 3.8942 3.8829 3.8013 3.6473 3.4173 3.1060 2.7063 2.2096 1.6046
LHN 3.9479 3.9352 3.8490 3.6878 3.4487 3.1278 2.7194 2.2158 1.6065
LF Coop 3.8078 3.8562 3.8442 3.7719 3.6390 3.4458 3.1921 2.8781 2.5036
LF ML 3.9479 3.8878 3.7526 3.5407 3.2498 2.8762 2.4148 1.8584 1.1966
LF FL 3.8942 3.8358 3.7067 3.5043 3.2247 2.8622 2.4098 1.8586 1.1973
LF N 3.9479 3.8874 3.7530 3.5429 3.2542 2.8824 2.4216 1.8640 1.1989
Conservative central bank: ρ = 0.75;1 − ρ = 0.25
LMLcons 3.9479 3.9129 3.8075 3.6306 3.3800 3.0526 2.6438 2.1473 1.5534
LFLcons 3.8523 3.8233 3.7346 3.5822 3.3597 3.0587 2.6694 2.1812 1.5827
LHMLcons 3.9479 3.9334 3.8441 3.6790 3.4358 3.1114 2.7011 2.1982 1.5931
LHFLcons 3.8523 3.8238 3.7391 3.5950 3.3839 3.0943 2.7130 2.2265 1.6214
LF MLcons 3.9479 3.8878 3.7526 3.5407 3.2498 2.8762 2.4148 1.8584 1.1966
LF FLcons 3.8523 3.8226 3.7279 3.5584 3.3033 2.9519 2.4948 1.9244 1.2346
Table 4B: Losses − H and F households (LH, LF) and union-wide (L) − Debt
nH=0.5 nH=0.55 nH=0.6 nH=0.65 nH=0.7 nH=0.75 nH=0.8 nH=0.85 nH=0.9
LCoop 4.8950 4.8533 4.7280 4.5192 4.2269 3.8511 3.3917 2.8489 2.2225
LML 5.0697 5.3056 5.2641 4.9940 4.5837 4.0676 3.4625 2.7794 2.0293
LFL 5.3826 6.2510 5.8882 5.4233 4.8733 4.2497 3.5623 2.8213 2.0405
LN 5.1264 5.9954 5.6737 5.2541 4.7494 4.1681 3.5174 2.8049 2.0416
LHCoop 4.8950 4.6041 4.2850 3.9378 3.5624 3.1589 2.7272 2.2674 1.7795
LHML 5.0697 4.2078 3.8818 3.5961 3.2889 2.9435 2.5531 2.1150 1.6287
LHFL 5.3826 3.8105 3.6292 3.4088 3.1435 2.8309 2.4701 2.0614 1.6067
LHN 5.1264 3.7865 3.6356 3.4368 3.1862 2.8819 2.5232 2.1101 1.6433
LF Coop 4.8950 5.1578 5.3925 5.5990 5.7774 5.9276 6.0497 6.1436 6.2094
LF ML 5.0697 6.6474 7.3375 7.5900 7.6049 7.4398 7.1002 6.5449 5.6352
LF FL 5.3826 9.2339 9.2766 9.1647 8.9096 8.5062 7.9314 7.1275 5.9452
LF N 5.1264 8.6952 8.7308 8.6292 8.3971 8.0270 7.4944 6.7422 5.6260
Conservative central bank: ρ = 0.75;1 − ρ = 0.25
LMLcons 5.2812 5.4786 5.4105 5.1252 4.6957 4.1573 3.5302 2.8288 2.0665
LFLcons 5.2958 5.4233 5.3344 5.0430 4.6150 4.0824 3.4638 2.7725 2.0228
LHMLcons 5.2812 4.4176 4.0945 3.7840 3.4398 3.0539 2.6257 2.1574 1.6530
LHFLcons 5.2958 4.3213 3.9224 3.5913 3.2549 2.8940 2.5010 2.0719 1.6053
LF MLcons 5.2812 6.7754 7.3844 7.6158 7.6261 7.4675 7.1485 6.6332 5.7886
LF FLcons 5.2958 6.7701 7.4525 7.7389 7.7884 7.6477 7.3151 6.7424 5.7806
41